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JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.'
Nothing is clearer today than the need of attention to
administration in all its aspects. The value of any legal conception may be measured by its contact with the realities of life;
except as it does service to men it is sterile and profitless. What
is the most perfect system of substantive law without a procedure by which its rights and duties are made something more than
abstractions? The Constitution of the United States almost
pales beside the fundamental law of Mexico in its solicitude for
life, liberty, and property, and its insistence on the freedom of
he legislative and judiciary from exdcutive encroachment ;2 yet
the requirement that "no one shall exercise violence to enforce
'An address delivered before the Law Association of Philadelphia, January 2.5. 1915.

*Art. 2. In the Republic all are born free. Slaves who set foot upon the
national territory shall recover, by that act alone, their liberty, and shall
have a right to the protection of the laws.
Art. 4. Everyone shall be free to engage in any honorable and useful
profession, industrial pursuit, or occupation suitable to him, and to avail himself of its products.
Art. 5. No one shall be obliged to perform personal work without just
compensation and without his full consent (unless the work be imposed as
a penalty by the judicial authority).
Art. 6. The expression of ideas ;hall not be the object of any judicial
or administrative investigation, except in case it attacks morality, the rights
of a third party, provokes some crime or misdemeanor, or disturbs public
order.
ArL 9. No one shall be deprived of the right peacefully to associate or
unite with others for any lawful purpose but only citizens of the Republic
(585)
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his rights" is not self-executing.3 And even this side the Rio
Grande our attention is insistently called to defects in the administration of justice which make some of our rights things of legal
theory rather than living realities. Such complaints are not to
be neglected. They call for a re-examination of settled habitsfor an effort to face the facts of life, and appraise things at their
real worth-for applying the test of common sense to methods
made familiar by long use. The community is in no temper to
tolerate practices which have no justification except that they
have been followed in the past; and we lawyers are not immune
from the danger of accepting words, preferably pompous words

in a foreign language, as convenient substitutes for ideas, or following a beaten track because doing as we have seen others do is
easier than thinking. One of the great needs of the present time
is simplifying and unifying; for in the outpour of decisions from
many courts and in the vast complexity. of life we are likely to
may assemble in order to take part in the political affairs of the country.
No armed assembly shall have the right to deliberate.
Art. 1.3. In the Mexican Republic no one shall be judged by special laws
or by special tribunals. Martial law may exist only for crimes and offenses
which have a definite connection with military discipline. The law shall
dctermine with absolute clearness the cases included in this exception.
Art. 14..No retroactive law shall be enacted. No one shall be judged or
sentenced but by virtue of laws made prior to the act, and exactly applicable
to it, and by a tribunal which shall have been previously established by law.
Art. i7. No one shall be arrested for debts of a purely civil character.
No one shall exercise violence in order to enforce his rights. The tribunals
shall always be prompt to administer justice, which shall be gratuitous,
judicial costs being consequently abolished.
Art. 27. Private property shall not be taken without the consent of the
owner, except for a public purpose, and upon previous indemnification. The
law shall determine the authority which may make the condemnation and
the conditions upon which it may be carried out.
Art. 28. There shall be no monopolies, nor exclusive privileges of any
kind nor prohibitions under the guise of protection to industry. The only
exceptions to this shall be those relative to the coining of money, to the
mails, and to the privileges which, for a limited time, the law may grant
to inventors or to the perfectors of some improvements.
Art. 5o. The supreme power of tl-e Federation shall be divided for its
exercise into legislative. executive, and judicial. Two or more of these
powers shall never be united in one person or corporation, nor shall the
legi-lative power be vested ;i one individual.
Art. 85. The powers and duties of the President shall be the following:
I. To promulgate and execute the laws passed by the Congress of the
Union, providing, within the executive sphere, fur their exact observance.
XII. To give the judicial power the assistance which 'may be necessary
for the prompt exercise of its functions.
'"A legal proposition without legal compulsion behind it is a contra-
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be lost unless we can lay hold on what is broad and significant
and fundamental.
A year or so ago the Supreme Court of the United States by
the vote of a single judge held 4 that the Constitution of the
United States forbade the application to a trial in the Federal
Courts of a Pennsylvania statute permitting the entry of judgnient for a defendant, when the trial court ought to have directed'
that very judgment but had erroneously refused to do so, A
verdict.should confessedly have been ordered at the trial as a
matter of law; nevertheless according to the decision the higher
court could not, without violating the constitutional right of
trial by jury, do the very thing the trial judge should have
done.
The reasoning of the majority is a tempting subject
for .discussion; and when such doctors disagree in terms of five
to four it is no presumption for humbler legal folk to have
an opinion. In my own State some of us who think well of trialby jury are content that our court has found it possible to escape
the conclusions of the Slocum caseS and I conjecture a similar
satisfaction among the Pennsylvania bar in the concurrence of
your eminent court with the views of Mr. Justice Hughes and
his associates in dissent. But I shall not take a feeble flail to
straw so well threshed; indeed a discussion of the Slocum case
on its merits would be beside my purpose. I, wish only to con-.
sider the decision in ternis of its actual purport and effect, and
the theory of a trial which underlies it.
The decision makes the right to a jury trial not merely the
right to go to a jury on a material issue of litigated fact-that
right the statute recognizes-but the r-ight to do this twice if the
litigant fails to prove his case the first time. He tried his case
once, presenting the best he had; or if he did not, it was nobody's
diction in itself; a fire that burns not, a light that shines not."

Ihering,

Zweck in Recht (3rd ed.) I, 322.
"Covenants without the sword are but words and of no strength to
sccure a man at all." Hobbes (Molesworth ed.), III, 154.
chap. 14.
Cf. Kinglake, Crimea, vol. "i,
I am indebted for these citations to Mr. Hershey's valuable paper "Covenants without the Sworde, Maryland State Bar Association Reports (19o9),
741.
'Slocuin v. New York Life Insurance Co.. 228 U. S. 364 (1913).
" Bothwell v. Boston Elevated Railway Co., 215 Mass. 467 (1913).

588

UNIVERSITY bF PENNSYLVANIA .LAW REVIEW

fault but his own. He thought it was a good case in point of
law, and the trial judge made the mistake of agreeing with him.
Now that their mistake has been revealed the Constitution guarantees him the opportunity (or shall we say the temptation) of
discovering a new case-an opportunity the value of which is
uncomfortably likely to depend, among other things, on his moral
fibre. It is not merely "the right of trial by jury", but the right
of two trials by jury, which is "preserved" by the Seventh
Amendment.
This theory of a right to two trials, enshrined in the Constitution, involves consequences so surprising as to suggest some
fundamental misconception of trial by jury, either on the part of
the framers or the interpreters of the Seventh Amendment. And
there is much in American practice to indicate such a misconception.
Jury trial, in many parts at least of this country, little resembles what our ancestors brought with them from England.
Englishmen, with their genius for adapting old institutions to
the needs of popular government, 6 have developed through the
centuries a mode of trial by which the sense and experience of a
body of plain men, helped and directed by a trained magistrate,
are used to solve disputed problems of fact. Such a trial was
always a trial by judge and jury; contr6l and guidance by the
court was one of its essential features; it was never supposed that
"When one scrutinizes the English Constitution, it is like looking at the
nests of birds or at the curious and intricate work of beavers and insects;
its strange contrivances seem not so much the ordered and foreseeh result
of human wisdom as a marvellous outcome of instinct, of a singular political
sense and apprehension, feeling its sure way for centuries, amid all sorts
of obstacles, through and- around and over them, with the busy persistence
of a tribe of ants. England, in emerging from the Middle Ages, has brought
along its ol forms and institutions-king and lords and all the phraseology
of feudal subjection-but it has harnessed all these stately mediaeval appearances into the service of freedom. Through the extraordinary energy of the
English political genius. the old institutions have grown elastic and significant of new thought. 'I, the writer,' says the author of Ottimo Commento,
'heard Dante say that never a rhyme had led him to say other than he would,
but that mary a time and oft he had made words say in his rhymes what
they were not wont to express for other poets.' In like manner the English
have forced their familiar institutions to express their highest political conceltions. 'Never an institution has led them to say other than they would;
and, indeed, they have said through these institutions things that other
nations have not known how to express." Thayer, Legal Essays, igi-2.
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an untrained tribunal, or opposing advocates, could be looked to
for effective administration. It is a far cry from such a proceeding to a contest conducted tinder rules which treat the judge
with suspicion, if not with contempt, and permit two forensic
gladiators to dominate the scene.- Precautions are taken to prevent
his mitigating the effects of their oratory; and except for ruling
on questions of law he sits silent until something like a breach of
the peace is threatened. Even in .that event his first care must be
to do nothing prejudicial to anybody. His two duties, in other
words, are inactivity and ruling on law points. Both of these hepractices extensively. He is confronted at any moment and in
any quantity with legal prollems of all degrees of difficulty,
raising all sort of points. He must rule on these with no proper
chance for study, and largely at the mercy of the unequal learning and plausibility of opposing cbunsel, each seeking,
in the heat of trial to help his case rather than the court. To
each of these rulings, in making which he labors under such disadvantages, an exception may be taken. The penalty for any
error is the panacea of a new trial-a penalty not only too heavy,
btt one which, by delaying justice and increasing its expense,, is
largely visifed on'the wrong persons. This mass of new trials,
too, is swollen by those in which the verdict, rendered without
the help which under the English system the jury wotild have
received before it was rendered, is set aside as against the weight
of evidence. As has been well said by Professor Sunderland,4
the judge is forced to "sit mute, illow the verdict to be rendered
"Our law of procedure distrusts the judge profoundly." Professor
Pound in 4 Itj. L.w RLv. 398 (i910). "Anciently and until lately, the
judge, holding his court, was the principal personage. Ile was clothed
with the insignia of dignity, and represented majesty-the majesty of the
law. It is so now to some. but not to the same. extent." Reade, J.. in
State v. Miller, 75 N. C. 73 (18-6), enforcing a statute which forbids the
court to limit the time of any attorney in argument. See also the .remarks
of Mr. Justice Brown of the Supreme Court of the United States in his
address on "Judicial Independence", discussing statutes providing that if a
judge refuses to sign a bill
of exceptions, "it shall be lawful for any two
attorneys who may be present at the time to sign such bill of exceptions,
which shall have the same force and effect as if signed by the judge",'
forbidding judges to require counsel to stand during the examination of
witnesse, and other like enactments. 12 Rep. Am. Bar Ass. 273-284 (1889).
'The Inefficiency of the Ameri,-an Jury, T2 Micn. LAw RFV. 302, 314,
315 (1915).
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without a word of warning, and then destroy it," so that while
the jury are "flattered to their faces by being told" that they are
the exclusive judges of the facts, this fiction is promptly "repudiated behind their backs." In such ways we have suffered a
pest of new trials to grow tip in this country which is as great a
reproach to our judicial administration as is the curse of typhoid
fever to our care for the public health.
For some States this picture is overdrawn; in others it
falls short of the truth. Such absurdities as forbidding the court
to instruct the jury in any foiin except by affirming written requests of counsel, 9 or putting the charge before counsels' closing
arguments,10 make contrasts with the real trial by jury more
glaring and grotesque than man)' of the Continental imitations
which look so strange to us. Even the best American practice
exposes itself to such criticism far more than it should. We have
become used to our local ways and we accept them; in a measure
we make the best of them, as any healthy organism adapts itself
to a wound. But although it grows on, the scar remains, and it
may require the perspective of a detached vision to realize how
serious are the consequences. The delays and failures in the administration of justice of which we hear so much today may be
due in no small part to our departure from English trial practice.
Since I have said so much, and may say more, in praise of
English methods, let me disclaim at once any indiscriminate
laudation of things English.- Any notion of a general superiority of English over American law would be wide of the mark.
The state of legal education in the two countries would of itself
go far to answer such a suggestion. Either in the history or the
'By Miss. Code of i9o6 , §793, for example, the judge "cannot of his
own motion gi'e any instructions whatever; those given must be in writing
and at the request of the party". Bangs v. State, 61 Miss. 363, 365 (1883).
The puipose of this act is to protect the jury "from any improper influence
on the part of the court, and thereby the better to preserve the sanctity of
the ti ial by jury"; and it is violated by "a succinct, extremely intelligible,
and very accurite explanation of the principle of the criminal law applicable
to the case before tle jury": \Villiams v. State, 32 Miss. 389. 397 (18=(6) ;
or by correctly ;nswering in the affirmative a question from the jury whether
on ao indictment for n-rder they had the right to convict the defendant
Otller statutes not
of nmnslaughter. Cilbert v. State 78 Miss. 300 (1900).
much better are collected in Thompton on Trials (2nd ed.), §2375.
' Col. Code Civil Proc., §187, cL 6.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION

theory of the common law, too, it would be easy to point out
fields in which England has been obliged to look to American
scholars. Or if it be a question of the Bench, the work of such
men as Gibson and Tilghman and Sharswood-their willingness
to go back to fundamental principles, and their power of illuminating gene'alization'l-may be compared with the contented.
superficiality with which English judges so often reason from
mere cases, leaving the law in a set of separate compartments
with nothing but precedent to divide them. But whatever our
development on this side of the water in matters of substantive
law and legal theory, we may as well frankly recognize that in
administration lies our special weakness, as well as the special
strength of the English. Neither national sensitiveness nor national .self satisfaction should blind us to the lessons to be learned
from 1hem.
If the question were how our distorted form of jury trial
came about the reasons might not be hard to find in history. Men
in whose memory the trial of your great Founder was fresh
needed no excuse for fearing judicial tyranny;12 and it would
have been strange, after the noble resistance of Edward Bushell
and his fellow.jurors,' 3 if the colonists had not looked to the jury
as the protector of popular liberties. The tradition of such views
would naturally persist; and generations .accustomed to lay
judges' 4 had no such inducements to restore controlling power to
the judge as might have been felt with magistrates learned in the
law."5 A primitive community, moreover, lacking the amuse"In

the preface to the third edition of his treatise on Negligence, p.

VIII, Mr. Beven explains the omission of American cases as due to the
increasing divergence of English and American authority-a divergence
arising in great part from a broader and deeper development of the sub-

ject in this country-and adds "Yet the Americans have a genius for law;
and the learning and brilliancy of the judgments found in Johnson's or
Metcalf's or indeed in any of the best American reports on the historical
development of the common law is such that no English writer.'can afford
to neglect them".
"Mr. Loyd has pointed this out in his "Early Courts of Pennsyl-

vania", 42.
"Cf. A Sixteenth Century Jury,

25 GREEN BAn, a96 (1913).
"Loyd, Early Courts of Pennsylvania, 53, io7; Pound, Administration
of Justice in the Modern City, 26 HARv. L. REV. 303 (1913).

'Other reasons are pointed out by Professor Pound in his article on
"'ntne Principle- of Procedural Reform", 4 ILL. LAw REV. 388 (xigo).
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ments of urban life, lacked also some of our modern inducements
for abbreviating trials and suppressing the dramatic activities of

counsel.16

The pioneer who turned to good account the means

of entertainment afforded by the courthouse, had little reason
to complain of a system which promoted new trials; else the
practice, which seems so strange to us today, of allowing two
jury trials in all cases as a matter of right, could not have persisted as long as it did in many places. 1" Such things eventually
disappeared, as did your statute 5 (after remaining on the statute
book for over twenty-five years) which forbade the citation of
English precedents after the Declaration of Independence; but
habits of thought inbherited from a time when such things seemed
rational may have had their influence in making it possible for
eminent lawyers to entertain such a notion of jury trial as is exhibited in the Slocum case.
The important point, however, is not how our present evils
came about, but how they may be cured. The first step in finding the cure is the diagnosis; and this is not difficult.
The great defect in our system is'that it does not call on the
trial judge to play his proper part either as a judge or an administrator. So far as administration is concerned it may almost be
said that it shuts its eyes to the whole matter, conceiving of him
only as a judicial officer, and forgetting that administration is a
" As Professor Pound has said in The Administration of Justice in the
Modern City, 26 HAM. LAw REV. 320 (1913): "The farmer, remote from the
distractions of city life, found his theatre in the cdurt house, and looked to
politics and litigation for amusement."
" In the Federalist, No. 83, Hamilton says that in Georgia, "an appeal
of course lies from the verdict of one jury to another, which is called a
special jury", and that "in the four Eastern states" "there is an appeal of
course from one jury to another till there have been two verdicts out of
three on one side". Judge Story refers to the same practice in U. S. v.
Wonson, z Gall. 5,14 (U. S. C. C. 1812). In Massachusetts 'this right to a
.econd jury trial, obtained by a statutory process known as a review, continued well into the last century. Quincy, 558n; 6 Dane Ab. 453-462; Swett
v. Sullivan, 7 Mass. 342 (1&1:). This was finally changed in x818 (St.
1817-8. c. 85) ; but not till after broad hints from the bench. "The policy of
'eviews is certainly questionable. rhey may have been of more utility in
former times than they are at present." Burrell v. Burrell, 1o Mass. 221, 222
(1813). "Reviews of right, to try a second or third time matters of fact,
are impolitick as tending to introduce perjury or embracery." Perry v.
Goodwin, 6 Mass. 498, 500 (181o).
"Act of March ig, 18:o, P. L 136; Act of March 29, 1836, P. L 224;
J
Loyd, Early Courts of Pennsylvania, 15o.
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great part of his work. In his merely judicial capacity, on the
other hand, upon which its attention is focussed, it makes extravagant and unreasonable demands upon him. Thus it calls on
him, not only to do what he ought not to be expected to do, but
also to leave undone much of a judge's real work.
The first of these defects should be met by giving the judge
full powers of administration, and making him use them. His
should be the responsibility for the prompt and decorous conduct
of the trial, and for making the proceedings march to a conclusion. He should be, in fact as in theory, "the directing and controlling mind at the trial, and not a mere functionary to preserve
order, and lend ceremonial dignity to the proceedings.' 9 One
way in which his power should be exercised much more vigorously than is usually done is in controlling the bar, preventing
controversies between opposing counsel, protecting witnesses
from improper treatment, cutting short unprofitable cross-examination. The scope allowed by our ordinary practice to counsel
is very excessive. In theory a lawyer has no right to open his
mouth except for three purposes: to address the jury in opening
and closing, to examine or ciross-examine witnesses,. to.present
objections and arguments to the court. There is no reason why
he should be permitted to speak a word to opposing counsel for
any purpose. If this statement sounds doctrinaire and extreme,
that very fact indicates the laxity with which we have come to
take for granted unnecessary and wasteful talk by counsel-talk
which even when innocent and well intentioned is often provocative of a different sequel. An exact adherence to these principles
is not only sound in theory, but is perfectly practicable, and their
steady application produces an almost magical result. Trouble
between counsel disappears for the simple reason that nothing is
started which can lead.to it.
In the next place, the judge should be called on for all possible help to the untrained tribunal over which he is presiding in
its difficult work of passing on the facts. In long trial, perhaps involving hard questions of expert judgment, the business
" Whitney v. Wellesley & Boston Street Railway, 197 Mass. 495, 502

(1908).
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of weighing conflicting testimony is a serious task for men unused to analysis or to abstract ideas; and a system which gives
full scope.to the eloquence of lawyers and then denies the jury
the assistance of the only- trained and impartial mind in the
court room, whatever its excuse in days of royal tyranny or lay
magistrates, is today a senseless perversion. Pennsylvania. belongs in theory to those more'enlightened communities which retain the common law right of the judge to express an opinion on
the facts-a right which fearlessly and justly exercised might do
much, without any change in our system, to relieve the much discussed evils of expert testimony.2 0 There is reason to believe,
however, that the judge's exercise of his rights in Pennsylvania
today falls short of what proper administration requires. 2 1 The
common law theory has been stated by a distinguished judge as
follows :22
"A judge does not discharge his duty who contents himself with being the mere passive recipient of evidence which he
is afterwards to reproduce to the jury, without pointing out
"See Professor Sunderland's article, already mtntioned, on "The Inefficiency of the American Jury", 13 Micn. LAw REv. 302 (xg15).

The recognition of this power by the Supreme Court, while distinct,
is not expressed in language which tends to encourage its use. Leibig v.
Steimer, 94 Pa. 466 (i88o); McCormick v. McCormick. 194 Pa. io7 (9soo);
Fitzpatrick v. Union Traction Co., 2o6 Pa. 335 (19o3). And an outsider
vho reads the proceedings on the impeachment of Judge Porter in 1825
is led to conjecture- that there may be things in local tradition tending
toward caution in the exercise of such powers by the Pennsylvania judiciary.
One ground of impeachment, presented by counsel for the managers as "a
transaction in which the rights of the jury were wantonly and grossly
trampled under foot"-"a gross insult to the jury" (who "knew more of
men and manners and mankind from their relative situations and avocations in life than the judge, who is a mere man of books, can do")-"a violation of his official duty by an interference with the rights, the powers, and
the duties of the jury'-"an attempt to control them improperly in their
verdict" which "in an individual would have been embracery, a vile and
pestiferous criminal offence", and "in the respondent" was "no less"--coihsisted, on the managers' own showing only in refusing to accept a verdict
rendered in flat violation of the judge's instructions on a point of law,
directing the jury to retire and reconsider it, reprimanding counsel who
attempted in open court to incite disobedience to these instructions, and
setting aside the verdict when persisted in. (Report of the Trial of Hon.
Robert Porter, 6, 57-8, 72-3, 117. T1r-2. 172-3, 185, 202-4, 223, 245-8, 272-4,
-6.) If, as alleged by his accusers, -the judge said he would not allow
the jury to kick the law out oi the court house" his conduct fitted a not
unworthy purpose.
Cockburn, C. J..charge to the jury in the Tichborne case. vol. 2, 814-5
(0874). Ci. the comments of Ruffin. J.. in Stale v. Mose,4, 2 Dev. 452, 457
(N. C. 183o), on the North Carolina statute of 1796 forbidding the judge to
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the weight of ihe facts and the inferences to which they properly and legitimately give rise. . . . It is his business to
take care that inferences which properly arise from the facts
shall be submitted to the consideration of the jury, with the
happy consciousness that if he in aught goes wrong, there is
the judgment of twelve men having experience in the everyday
concerns of life to set anythifig right in respect of which he may
have erred. But if the facts are such that, placed in the scale
to which they respectively belong, the one scale kicks the beam
and the other goes down,"the fault is in the nature of the case
and not in the conduct of the judge. . . . A jury assisted by
a judge is a better tribunal for the ascertaining of facts and the
establishment of truth than a judge unassisted by a jury; but
. . . it is the business of the judge to assist a jury . . . by
placing the whole case before them-not only bringing before
them -all the facts, but also pointing out the inferences which
appear to arise from those facts; and without this assistance
on the part of. the judge, the office of the juror is liable to be
imperfectly fulfilled. I have yet to learn that it is the business
of the judge to suppress facts beause "they make against the
accused; or to refrain from pointing out the conclusions to
which the facts, as established by the evidence, properly leadto suggest to the jury arguments or explanations of the unsoundness of which he is himself convinced; or to adopt those
of counsel when satisfied they are delusive; or to refrain, out
of tenderness to the accused, from-exposing fallacies and
sophistry, the hollowness of which he is able to see through,
but which may have the effect of misleading minds less accustomed than his own to dissect and analyze evidence in dealing with facts, aihd to find the way, amid the conflict of testicharge on the facts: "An unfair and partial exhibition of the testimony can
alone be complained of; and the app'ehension of that seems to have induced
the passage of'the law under consideration. It is not for us to say whether
that apprehension was well or ill founded; or whether the administration
of the law would not be more .certain, its tribunals more revered, and the
suitors better satisfied, if the Judge were required to submit his view upon
the whole case. and after the able and ingenious, but interested and partial
arguments of Counsel, to follow with his oxvn calm, discreet, sensible and
impartial summary of the case, including both -law and fact. Such elucidations from an upright, learned and discreet magistrate, habituated to the
investigation of complicated masses of testimony, often contradictory, and
often apparently so but really reconcileable, would be of infinite utility to a
conscientious jury in arriving at just conclusions-not by force of the Judge's
opinion, but of the reasons on which it was founded, and on which the jury
would still have to pass.. If this duty were imposed on the Judge, it is not
to be questioned, that success would, oftener than it does, depend on the
justire of the case. rather than the ability or adroitness of the advocate.
But such is certainly neither the duty, nor within the competency, of our
Judges."
"It is not too much to say of any period, in all English history, that
it is impossible to conceive of trial by jury as existing there in a form which
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mony, to the ascertaining of truth-truth and truth alone being
the object to be attained. If such a principle were admitted,
it would follow that the stronger and clearer the case against
the accused, the more reticent must be the judge, the more deficient in his duty in placing the case before the jury in the
clearest and plainest light."
On the administrative side, then, our system requires too
little of the judge. On the judicial side it errs almost as conspicuously by asking too much. It demands that he rule right; and
how unreasonable is the demand! Considering the number and
character of the questions presented, and the lack of opportunity
for study, it is unreasonable to suppose that anybody could give
the right answer to all. "Perfection is not to be expected in a
science that is but mildly described as inexact" ;23 and even if the
trial judge decide right, what will it profit him if the court which
has "the last guess on the law" decide wrong and reverse him? A
correct decision means, in terms of plain fact, such a decision as
the upper court will hereafter deem correct; and how can any
trial judge be sure of knowing that-? The pertinency of this
may be tested by any trial lawyer of experience if he will recall
how much oftener the best Nisi Prius judges he has known were
reversed than were some of their inferior brethren, and will then
ponder
the reasons for this notorious fact.
Having
made this inexorable demand on the trial
judge
that he rule correctly on the points of law presented to him, our
system demands nothing further of him. It leaves him free to
take a general verdict from the jury even though he has made a
series of rulings on difficult questions, and the result of reversing
him on any one of these will be a new trial. Here again the systeni errs egregiously on the administrative side, and leads to restilts that are as wasteful as they are unintelligent. Something.
would withhold from the jury the assistance of the court in dealing with
the facts. Trial by jury, in such a form as that, is not trial by jury in any
historic sense of the words. It is not the venerated institution which
2itracted the praise of Blackstone and of our ancestors, but something novel,
modern, and much less to be respected." Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on
Evidence, p. i88n.
See also comments of Mr. Justice Brown on such statutes in 12 Rep.
American Bar Association, pp. 274-276 (1889).
"People v. Strollo, 191 N. Y. 42, 68 (i08).
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more than ruling on the questions presented to him may often
be the very thing the judge should do to prevent the trial fromgoing to waste; and this further effort, which our system does
not require, is not an impossibility in its nature, like the present
-demand of legal infallibility, but is something of which any lawyer fit to be a judge should be capable. He is there to conduct a
trial; a proceeding for determining justly an issue of fact. The
facts must be tried somehow. Of old it was done by the ordeal
or by battle. Today it is not an appeal to bodily. strength or divine interposition, but to human reason. For this difficult and
important undertaking of sifting truth from falsehood a particular piece of machinery is provided by our system. It is a contrivance with obvious defects, easy to criticize and often criticized,--chiefly by those who are least familiar at first hand with
its workings. But whatever the defects or the merits of trial by
jury-and of its merits there is not a little to be said,-we must
accept it and make the best of it so long as our fundamental law
remains unchanged. It is undoubtedly an expensive and slow
moving process; so much the more imperative the necessity to
practice a good economy and avoid needless wastes in its use.
And the first duty of-the judge is to see that the jury do the work.
for which it was called together at the public expense: namely,
determiningthefacts. It is his responsibility that when the jury
is discharged those facts are determined once and for all. For
this purpose all that is necessary is that he so study the case on
trial as to understand what points of law it raises and what are
the controlling issues of fact. Any good lawyer should be
able to do this; it is precisely the task which is entrusted to a
master or auditor whenever a case is sent to him for hearing.
He is to report the facts; all the facts which the court will
need; when he has done this it is unimportant whether he
rules on the law or not. In some places rulings by masters
are common; but they make no difference in the result. No error
in law will embarrass a court thereafter or give ground for a*recommittal; indeed a court may prefer to do without rulings altogether. The facts, on the other hand, in all their material aspects, concern the master in the highest degree; and if he fails to
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make necessary alternative findings, and so necessitates the delay
and expense of a recommittal, he fails to perform his duty with
proper attention or intelligence. The analogy holds in all material points with a jury trial. It is by no means the most important
thing whether the judge's rulings on the law points raised by the
case be right or wrong- If wrong, they can be corrected. But it
is vital that he present the case to the jury in such a form that it
can decide the material.facts and put before-the upper court all the
materials necessary for a final disposition of the case.
What needs to be done for this purpose will vary with the
case. The problem may be simple, or it may not. Very often it
will call for the submission of special questions to the jury ;24
but a good judge 'Will never forget the importance of making such
questions few and plain, and avoiding the dangers of a mistrial
which long and complicated questions invite.3 This problem of
digesting the matter so as to present its essential features in a
simple and intelligible form may call for study and careful
"As Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood said in Patterson v. Kountz, 63 Pa. 246,.
252 (1870), this is "often a very convenient -practice, and prevents embarrassing questions from arising subsequently on a motion for a new trial, or on a writ of error, when it cannot otherwise be known on what 'grounds the
verdict was rendered.

In this instance . . . the verdict took the wind

out of all the plaintiffs' points and exceptions."
But as Mr. Justice Brown has pointed out (12 Am. Bar Ass. Rep., pp.
279-28o [088j]) the judge should not be required to put questions in all
cases. In this respect the act recently approved by the Pennsylvania Bar
Association (i8 Pa. Bar Ass. Rep., p. 270 [1912]) seems opcn to criticism.
This point was much discussed in the Massachusetts Bar Association in 1913,
and the Association decided that it could not recommend stronger language
than that which uras finally adopted: "When any such question of law shall
arise in a trial the judge shall by leaving appropriate questions to the jury
. . . ascertain so ffir as practicable all the facts both as to liability and
damages necessary on any thqory of the law to enable the court to make
a proper final disposition of the case unless in the opinion of the court such
a course is inexpedient under the circumstances of the case." Mass. Statutes;
1913, c. 716, s. 2. No doubt a weak judge may evade such a statute as this
by discovering that questions are "inexpedient"; but an absolute requirement forces an unjustifiable waste of time in some cases. Suppose, for
example, the judge plainly sees that there is nothing in the plaintiff's case,
and that he should be nonsuite4 without calling on the defendant. If the
facts must be specially found the defendant will be practically forced to put
in his evidence, to nobody's advantage.
It is to be remembered that a statute requiring special interrogatories to
the jury, anti providing that the answers shall prevail over the general verdict,
does not contravene the Seventh Amendment.. Walker v. So. Pac. Ry., 165
U. S. 593 (1897).
'"The practice of permitting a large number to be pdt is almost sure
and is usnally intendtd' to produce answers inconsistent wiih the general
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thought by the judge; but his function is one which assumes the
capacity and the dispo.sition to think. With the help of counsel,
to which he is always entitled, there is no reason why he should
not be able to frame questions, disposing of the controversy in
any aspect of the law, which can be answered by the jury without
confusion or embarrassment.
The importance of obtaining from the jury the necessary
material for a final decision has always been understood by English courts. They have never tolerated the wasteful and unintelligent practice to which we tamely submit of taking a general
verdict and letting the case go up on exceptions ;26 on the contrary

it has been their regular practice, as a reference to the English
reports for a hundred years before the Judicature Act will show,
to -take a verdict from the jury with leave to enter.a different
verdict thereafter if the law required it.2' This simple and flexible'method, whicl can be made to fit all sorts of situations, gave
the judge time to consider the law after the verdict without delaying the trial, and left the matter in such shape that any error
could be corrected by the appellate court. It did this, too, without trenching in the least on the jurys powers. Even those whose
sensitiveness concerning judicial encroachment makes them object to the judge's charging on the facts cannot reasonably criticize this feature of the English practice. It exalts, not limits,
the jury's function, for it provides that their labors shall not be
in vain, but shall settle the case iccording to the law.
The Pennsylvania statute which was before the court in the
Slocum case aims at the same just results as the English practice, and in a measure accomplishes them. It covers only a part
of the ground, because it can be invoked only by a party who is
entitled to have judgment entered in his favor as a matter of law
verdict." Mr. Justice Brown in 12 Am. Bar. Assn. Rep., p. 280 (7889). For
the evils of such a practice see also "Special Interrogatories to Juries", IV. AV.
Thornton, 2o A-At. L.hw Ray., pp. 366, 381-2 (1886); Thayer's Preliminary
Treatise on Evidence, p. 218n. When the interrogatories numbered "nearly
two hundred" it is not surprising that the jury resorted to "a special verdict
by way of answers". Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Scantland, rsi Ind. 488, 49o
(1898).
"Thayer, Preliminary Treatise on Evidence, 239-240, 529.
"See Lord Blackburn's exposition of this practice and its history in
.Dublin etc. Ry. Co. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155, 12o4-5 (1878).
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on all the evidence,25 and so does not extend to the other situations in which the same method may usefully be applied, '2 often
with the aid of some special findings of fact. Still it meets many
situations and may fairly be classed with those "practical
reforms for facilitatirig business without impairing settled
legal principles" in which, as a great judge has said,
"Pennsylvania has always been in the front." 30 If, as
might at first sight appear from the decision in the Slocum
case,, the result at which the statute aims has now become impossible in the Federal Courts, this is much to be regretted. A
new trial then becomes a matter of right even when the issue has
once been fully tried, and the plaintiff has been proved to have
no case. The suit should confessedly have ended then and there,
and it would have done so but for the error of the trial judge.
The matter being a mere question of law it is not apparent in
reason why a higher court should have less power than a lower
one. And the result is worse than waste because of the sharp
temptation which the new trial offers the prevailing party to
make his evidence meet the demands of the law as now laid
down. Any lawyer familiar with trials knows how real is this
danger, and how prone are juries to disregard the sinister meaning of the .change. In Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, therefore, whose courts see no violation of the constitutional right of'
trial by jury in the statute condemned in the Slocum case, that
decision came as a blow. It seemed to mean that the desirable
powers conferred by the statute were denied to the Federal
Courts until the Constitution of the United States should be
amended. But upon further examination the-point on which the
decision turns reduces itself to a matter of mere form which may
be met by adopting the common English practice before the Judicature Act. This was a reservation of leave to enter a different
verdict if the law required it. As this leave was reserved at the
trial, and by the consent of the jury, the verdict finally entered
The careful opinions in Wilde v. Trainer, r9 Pa. 439 ('869); Casey v.
Paving Co.. 198 Pa. 348 (igoi), and Dalmas v. Kemble, 215 Pa. 410 (19o6).
make plain the scope and effect of the Act of "i9o5 and its predecessors, and
5
clear up some confusion in the earlier decisions.
"See note 32 below.
'Dalmas v. Kemble, 215 Pa. 410, 412 (19o6).
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pursuant to the leave was the jury's verdict.3 ' Thus the only
difficulty which the majority of the court found insuperable-the
lack of a verdict of the jury-is met.
It is important therefore, that States in the present predicament of Pennsylvania and Massachusetts should add to their existing statutes a provision giving the court the power to deal
with the matter after the English fashion. By the terms of the
Conformity Act it .would be the duty of the Federal Court to
follow the State practice; and the verdict once entered, would
32
be safe from attack on constitutional grounds.
The attentive exercise by a trial judge of his full administrative powers ought to go far to eliminate the evil of new trials.
So in Mead v. Robinson, Barnes's Notes (3rd ed.) 451 (744), where
the reservation provided for a nonsuit, if the opinion of the court should be
with the defendant, "The Court declared the Form of the Rule to be wrong;
it oight to be, If the Opinion be for Defendant, that the Verdict be entered
for him ex Assensu Juratorum. This Method of reserving Points of Law
came in lieu of a Special Verdict, and ought to make a final Determination
on each Side in all Cases, except Ejectment, where the Party may begin
again at his Pleasure."
' I am indebted to my learned friend John L. Thorndike of the Boston
Bar for this suggestion. In order to adapt it to the Massachusetts practice,
Mr. Thorndike has prepared the following bill and memorandum: "When
exceptions to any ruling or'direction of a judge shall be alleged, or any
question of law shall be rcserved, in the course of a trial by jury, and the
circumstances shall be such that, if the ruling or direction at the trial was
asrong, the verdict or finding ouqht to have been entered for a different
party or for larger or smaller damages or othcricse than as uws done at
the trial, the judge may reserve leave -with the assent of the jurv so to
enter the verdict or findinkq. if upon the question or questions of law so
raised the court shall decide that it ought to have been so entered. The
leave reserved, as seell as the findings of the jury upon any particularquestions of fact that may have been subfititted to thent, shall be eniered in the
record of the proceedings, and, if upon the question 'or questious of law
it shall be decided either by the same court or the appellate court that the
verdict or finding ought to have been entered in accordance with the leave
reserved, it shall be entered accordingly and, when so entered, shall.have the
sanie effect as if it had been entered at the trial." [This bill has been passed
by the Massachusetts Legislature, and is now Mass. St. 1915, c. 185. It has
already been applied in the Federal Court; Freeman v. Stebbins, U. S. Dist.
Ct., Dist. of Mass., April 2o, i915.]
"In order to enable the jury to give their verdict according to the law
as it ought to have been laid down at the trial, the practice arose in England
early in the eighteenth century, for the judge at the trial to reserve leave to
enter the verdict according to the direction which it might afterwards be
decided that he ought to have given at the trial: Lord Blackburn in Dublin
& Wexford Ry. Co. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas., pp. 1204-7205 (1878). This was
done with the assent of the jury. Mead v. Robinson, Barnes. 451 (1744);
Treacher v. Hinton, 4 B. & Ald. 413. 416 (1821), and the verdict ultimately
entered was thus in fact the verdict of the jury just as if the proper direction
had been given at the trial and the verdict actually entered then. Bothwell's
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It should bring about a situation where the mere fact of a new
trial means discredit to some of the ministers of justice concerned in the first trial-judge, jury, or counsel. That is what
it ought to mean; but it is far from our present system, under
which new trials are continually granted for errors which may be
nobody's fault. Does it necessarily reflect on a trial judge when
ai appellate court reverses him onl a question of law by a majority of one?
Case,

215

Mass., p. 476 (1913).

This was found a convinient means of cor-

recting the mistakes of the judge at the trial and of obtaining the verdict of
the jury in accordance with the rulings that he ought to have made.
. "Thus, in an action for negligence, a verdict was given for the plaintiff,
with leave to enter it for the defendant according to the opinion of the
court on the question of law whether the defendant was responsible for the
acts of the workmen who were negligent. Taylor v. Greenhalgh, L. R. 9

Q. B. 487 (1874).

"So, in an action against the acceptor of a bill of exchange payable at
a banker's, the plaintiff was nonsuited, with leave to enter a verdict for him,
if the court decided that notice to the defendant of non-payment was unnecessary. Treacher v. Hinton, 4 B. & Ald. 413 (821).
"In an action for breach of contract, a verdict was given for 128 (corn:
posed of £ and £2o for specified damage), beyond £2 paid into court, with
leave to reduce the verdict by the £8 and £2o, or either, if the court should
be of opinion that the plaintiff was not entitled to both or either. Hobbs
v. London & South-Western Ry. Co., L. R. id Q. B. 111, 113 (1875); see also
Dittmar v. Norman, xi8 Mass., pp. 323, 324 (1875).

"It was necessary that the leave so to enter the verdict should be reserved
at the trial, in order that the verdict might be that of the jury (see Treacher
v. Hinton, 4 B. & Ald., p. 417 [1821]), for the court could enter only such
a verdict as the jury assented to.
"According to this bill, where leave is reserved at the trial, the proper
verdict may be entered either by the appellate court upon a bill 6f exceptions or report, or by the judge that tried the ease upon motion, and in the
latter case the decision of the judge would be subject to revision upon a
bill of exceptions or report. By thi's means a judge can reserve questions
of law at the trial for further consideration, which he cannot do under the
existing law, as shown by Smith v. Lincoln, 198 Mass. 388, 391 (igo8). The
English judges often do this, e. g.: Watkins v. Naval Colliery Co., [i9ii] 2
K. B., pp. 163, 167; West Yorkshire Agency v. Coleridge, id. 326; Smith v.
Martin, id. 775, 777...
"By these provisions also the practice in the State courts aind in the
federal courts in the district would be assimilated. In the latter, according
to the decision of a majority in Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U. S., pp. 375, 399 (1913), when a verdict for one party is set aside on the
ground that there was no evidence to support it, judgment cannot be entered
for the other party without a verdict of the jury for that party', although
such a verdict ought to have been directed by the judge without allowing
the jury to consider the evidence. By reserving leave at the trial so to enter
the verdict upon decision of the ques.tion of law, the verdict of the jury is
given and entered in accordance with their assent given at the trial. Bothwell's Case, 215 Mass., p. 476 (1913). By the U. S. Rev. Sts., s. 914, the
practice in the federal courts conforms to that of the State courts. Glenn v.
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This desirable elimination of new trials can only be approximated so long as our law of evidence remains in its present form.
An error in ruling on evidence may often create a difficulty which
can be met by no leave reserved or'special question, but only by a
new trial. But this is largely due to our "exaltation of the ordinary rules of evidence, which are mere instruments of investigation, into an end in themselves," 33 and should be met by a more
rational and modern treatment of the law of evidence. Our law
goes beyond all bounds in giving litigants rights in mere procedure, and this even though the very rule which it thus makes a
matter of private property, was made not for the benefit of the
Sumner,

z32

U. S.

152,

x56 (1889); Central Transportation Co. v. Pullman

Co., 139 U. S., pp. 38-40 (1891)."

Mr. Thorndike has also drawn up the following forms to illustrate the
working of the statute:
"The jury find for the plaintiff and assess damages in the sum of eight

hundred and eighteen dollars, seventy-two cents.

"A. B., Foreman.
"Question-In case the jury find for the plaintiff, what additional damages should be given for the dualin manufactured before the abandonment
of the contract, if the plainiiff is entitled to recover for such dualin?
"Answer-Three hundred and fifty. dollars." See Dittmar v. Norman,
118 Mass. 319, 323 (1875).

"When the jury announce their verdict in court, the judge will say to
them that a question of law has been reserved for consideration by the
court, and that leave will be reserved with the assent of the jury to enter
the verdict for three hundred and fifty dollars in addition to the damages
found by them, if upon the question of law reserved the court shall decide
that the verdict ought to have been so entered. The jury will assent, and a
note of the leave so reserved will then be made at the foot or on the back
of the verdict or on the docket, and the verdict entered subject thereto, as
follows:
"Leave being reserved with the assent of the jury to enter the verdict
for three hundred and fifty dollars in addition to the eight hundred and
eighteen dollars and seventy-two cents damages found by them, if upon the
question of law reserved the court shall decide that the verdict ought to have
been so entered."
"Leave to reduce the damages would be similarly reserved, as in Hobbs v.
London & Southwestern Ry. Co., L. R. 1o Q. B. 1II, 113 0875)."
"In a case like Negus v. Simpson, 99 Mass. 388, 391-392 (i868), the damages would be ascertained according to the contentions of both parties, and
leave reserved to enter the verdict according to the proper rule, which would
have saved the second trial."
"So, a verdict being directed for the defendant, leave could be reserved to
enter the verdict for the plaintiff for the amount of a draft, upon the
decision of a question of law, as in Treacher v. Hinton, 4 B. & Ad. 413
(821).
So, if the jury find for the plaintiff in a case like Slocum's Case,
228 U. S. 364 (1913), the verdict would be entered for the plaintiff with leave
reserved to enter the verdict for the defendant if the court should decide that
tile judge ought to have directed such a verdict."
' Wigmore on Evidence, §21.
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litigant who invokes it, but to serve the general good by expediting and simplifying trials, 34 or even to protect the interests of a

third person.3 z How rational would our treatment of such matters look to a sane observer free from inherited prejudices? On
this point we may well take warning from the impressions which
our methods make on every intelligent layman. "None but a lawyer or one whose mind was biased by the learning of the law", to
use Lord Cowper's phrase, " " could view them with satisfaction.3 7 As was said by one whose studies in Jurisprudence, combined with experience in practice, gave him the perspective necessary to see the matter at its proper focus :8
"No unprejudiced observer can be blind to the excessive
credit and importance attached in judicial procedure to the
minutiae of the law of evidence. This is one of the last refuges
'The exclusion of evidence, for example, 'because it involves collateral
issues which outweigh its value-such as accidents to others or contradictions of a witness on immaterial matters.
'In this extreme case some courts have taken the rational view that the
erroneous admission of the evidence gave other litigants no ground of exception. People v. Kinglake, ii Cox C. C. 499 (i87o) ; but this is by no means
the universal doctrine. Westover v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 99 N. Y. s6 0885) ;
Com. v. Kimball, 24 Pick. 366, 369 (Mass. 1837); State v. Olin, 23 Wis. 3o9,
318 (1868).
'Brown v. Barkham, Prec. Ch. 461 (Eng. 1716).
Extravagant laudation of the rules of evidence, as if they were the
product of supernatural wisdom, is to be found all through the books. These
are specimens:
"All questions upon the rules of evidence are of vast importance "to all
orders and degrees of men; our lives, our liberty, and our property, are all
concerned in the support of these rules, which have been matured by the
wisdom of ages." Lord Kenyon in King v.- Eriswell, 3 T. R. 707v 721
(Eng. 179o).
"One of the most learned writers upon the spirit of the laws of England
has said that uncertainty in the law of high treason would prevent any state
from being free. This was the opinion of our ancestors, who, in Edward
the Third's time, crushed, by one statute, all the subtilties and uncertainties
that had been introduced into our laws. The relaxing the rules of evidence
is more dangerous in the administration of justice, than all the constructive
treasons that ever were invented." Best, C. J., in Strother v. Barr, 5 Bing.
x36, 154 (Eng. 1828).
"Generally I quite agree that I should desire to know the historical evidence about Spitalfields, which for every purpose, except that of deciding
the issue as to property between private persons, nobody would think of
excluding; but I yield to authority on the law of evidence without reluctance,
because I am satisfied that in the main the English rules of evidence are
just, and I am satisfied also that there is no portion of the English law
which ought more rigidly to be upheld." Hamilton, L. J., in AttorneyGeneral v. Homer, 2 Ch. 140. i56 (1913).
See also "Observations on the Law of Evidence", 13
A MICHIGAN LAw

Rzv. 355 (1915).
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of legal formalism. Nowhere is the contrast more striking
between the law's confidence in itself and its distrust of the
judicial intelligence. The fault is to be remedied not by the
abolition of all rules for the measurement of evidential value,
but by their reduction from the position of rigid and perempfory to that of flexible and conditional rules. Most of them
have their source in good sense and practical experience, and
they are profitable for the guidance of individual discretion,
though mischievous as substitutes for it."
This statement is the more striking as it comes from a British
source. Just as are Mr. Salmond's criticisms on the law of his
own country, we carry the methods which he condemns so much
farther that compared with ours their flexible and rational
handling of the law of evidence might seem the very thing that
The English barrister is bewildered when he
he advocates.
observes our incessant wrangling over evidence; and no wonder,
for we have transcended all bounds of reason.
If the law of evidence were treated as Mr. Salmond proposes a double gain would result. Insistence on unimportant
points of evidence, and the waste of time spent in discussing
them, would be mucl reduced, for there would no longer be any
profit in it. It is a mischief due first and foremost to the temptation
offered by'our system to each side-especially the side that scents
defeat-to make as large a collection of exceptions as-it can, hoping that something may be found among them to take the fancy of
an appellate tribunal. The present trial would thus be helped; and
there would be no less a gain in preventing new trials. This is the
true way to remove the stumbling block which the law of evidence puts in the way of statutes aimed at preventing reversals
for causes not going to the merits. If the aggrieved party had a
right to the admission or exclusion of the evidence, it is hard to
meet his argument that no one can tell what the jury would have
done if the ruling had been the other way. The answer should be
that except for some rules which vest a privilege in him, the violation of a rule of evidence is not a matter of private right at all.
It is only when the violation ir of an important and fundamental
Jurisprudcnce (-ith ed.) 452.
.Salmond.
Mr. Learning's observations on this point are interesting. "A Philadelphia Lawyer in the London Courts," 1u-4. See also Wigmore on Evidence, 121.
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sort, or palpably calculated to do him serious harm 40-the sort
of thing sometimes indicated by the phrase "abuse of discretion"
-that he should be allowed to complain. We may look forward
confidently toa time when this view will be accepted; when, as
Professor Wigmore prophesies :41
"Just as English legislators, after yielding to the twenty
years' pleading of Romilly, discovered after all that the enjoyment of the right of property in chattels could survive, without
the fancied protection of the penalty of death for larceny,--so
we shall some day awake to be convinced that a system of necessary rules of evidence can exist and be obeyed, without
affixing indiscriminately to every contravention of them the
monstrous penalty of a new trial."
The problems of appellate procedure are chiefly of this sort
-- of determining the extent to which litigants should be accorded
rights in matters of procedure, and obtaining from the jury.in all
cases the necessary material for a final decision on appeal. Once
this material has been obtained the difficulties about putting it in
proper shape for an appellate tribunal are relatively small. There
are indeed States still afflicted by practices more than six hundred
years old concerning exceptions. In England for centuries
means have been found of avoiding such troubles; the task of
preparing a bill of exceptions from the notes of Mr. Justice
Stareleigh is not the sort of thing that English courts would be
likely to spend their time on. Today the official stenographer
provides an escape from such inconveniences, even where exceptions are retained; and Pennsylvania is among the communities
enlightened enough to take advantage of this relief. Fortunately for your bar, it is thus in no position to realize what is involved in the process of reducing exceptions to "narrative
form"; for no one who has not made this attempt with an aggressive and demanding adversary can appreciate its full exasperations. When, however, as in this State, natural evolution
'Cf. the test laid down by the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
for grnting leave to appeal in criminal cases; whether "by some violation
of tbe prir,- iples of natural justice or otherwise, substantial and grave injustice
has been done." In re Dillet, 12 App. Cas. 459, 467 (1887); Ibrahim v. Rex,
£
A. C. 5¢,,
614-5 (1914).
Wigmore on Evidence, §21.
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has given the appellate tribunal its material at first hand and in
official form, and not in a paraphrase, the accuracy of which depends on how far opposing counsel have succeeded in neutralizing one another's attempts to inject color into the narrative, the
only serious problem is that of proper condensation. That may
be a matter to which your bar ought to give more attention, and
thereby render needed aid in the administration of justice. Burdening the parties with the expense of printing, and the court
with the labor of searching, swollen "machine made cases" full
of unnecessary matter is a serious evil for which no good excuse
can be offered ;42 but it may easily be cured if counsel will only
study the record with proper pains and cut out unnecessary matter. Often all the testimony which is really needed lies in the
narrowest compass. If counsel are lax ilitheir duty in this regard, the trial judge has ample means of enforcing it, and can do
so with little difficulty if lie is awake to his responsibilities. If,
as may Well be feared, trial judges fail to give due attention to
this matter, ifis only one more instance of the habit of focussing
attention on the judicial side of their work to the neglect of their
administrative function.

""If by any protest on our part the profession could be induced to
abandon the machine-made cases which, under the present system, have
taken the place of the methodical and carefully prepared cases and bills of
exception of former days, the court would plead earnestly for such a reform,
as it would be a great relief to every court of review, and aid in the dispatch
of business and in an intelligent administration of justice. Stenographers
have taken the place of the attorneys whose duty it is to prepare, and of
the counsel whose duty it is to peruse and examine, and of the judge who
should settle cases and exceptions for the purposes of review. The rough,
ill-digested and defective, and frequently unintelligible transcripts and translations of the stenographer's minutes of the trial, without correction or
explanation, are stitched together and labeled a case, or exceptions, as may
suit the fancy, and the labor is thrown upon the court to wade through a
mass of stuff and dig out the kernel of facts or the point of an exception
which may be buried beneath it. Some parts of the case before us are
entirely unintelligible; and the exceptions taken in the course of the trial
are so interjected, that it is not easy to place or apply them. Itis very likely
that parties may sometimes suffer by this process, which while it saves the
labor of the profession, very greatly adds to that of the court, and not
unfrequently embarrasses it in arriving at a certain and definite understanding of the merits. A rule of the Supreme Court might correct this evil to a
great extent. The practice of printing the evidence by question and answer,
in niosit cases, only benefits the printer. There are but few cases in which,
for any purpose, this method of setting forth the evidence is necessary or
proper." Allen, J., in Howland v. Woodruff, 6o N. Y. 73, 77 (1875).
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This weakness of our trial methods in administration is constantly to be observed. One instance may be found in the practice of hearing medical expert testimony, often at great length,
in suits for personal injuries which are presently taken from the
jury, perhaps without even calling on the defendant, because
there is no evidence of liability. Such a waste of time and money
is unpardonable when it could so easily be avoided by hearing the
evidence on liability first and finding whether there is a case for
the jury before going into the question of damages. It is satisfactory to observe that your court has lately had the wisdom to
correct this practice,4 still so common elsewhere; but a like disregard of promptness and economy in mere matters of judicial
housekeeping may be seen on every side. Such things ought not
to continue. Administration is no doubt the weak spot in a
democracy; and crying defects must remain until expert treatment of disease is seen to be as necessary for the body politic as
for the individual. There are encouraging signs, however, that
such an understanding is on the increase; and slowly as public
opinion moves in such matters, it has momentum when aroused.
Once it be aroused, the American "genius for law" ought not to
be pennanently inferior to that of our English relatives when, as
here, it is a question of inventiveness, practical efficiency, and
speed. One sign that a solution of the difficulties is approaching
will be the passing of the "cult of incompetence", 44 and the recognition that efficient administration depends first and last on
men; that in your Founder's historic words:
"Governments, like clocks, go from the motion men give
them; and as governments are made and moved by men, so by
them they are ruined, too. Wherefore governments rather depend upon men, than men upon governments."
E&ra Ripley Thayer.
School.
HarvardLaw
43Rule
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"See Lowell. Public Opinion and Popular Government, chapters 17. 18;
Faguet, The Cult of Incompetence.

